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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

R. C. SYRETT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

THE TROPIC & EAST FORK IRRIGArfiON CO~fP ANY and JOHN
H. JOHNSON,

Case

No. 6316

Defendants and Appellant.

SrfATEMENT OF FACTS AND ISSUES
This is a mandamus action brought by the plaintiff, a stockholder in the defendant corporation, to compel the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff water represented by his shares of stock in the corporation.
The defendant admits that the plaintiff is a stockholder but denies his right to water on his said land
described in the complaint.
The irrigation system involved in this dispute con-
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sists of a dam as a diversion works on the East .Fork of
the Sevier River (Tr. 113}, and a twelve mile canal running from the dam across a fairly level plateau for a
distance of about six miles and then dropping down a
very steep canyon, known as Water Canyon, to the Tropic
Valley, where it divides. Approximately one-half of the
water in the canal is diverted to the right to the town of
Tropic, and the other half is diverted to the left to Lossee
Valley. There are no laterals from the main canal for
the first three miles of its length. For the next three or
four miles the canal runs through plaintiff's farm, and
plaintiff and his predecessors in interest, have from time
to time constructed laterals from this main canal for the
purpose of diverting a portion of the water and using it
to irrigate their farms. (Tr. 112, 113.)) ·Plaintiff (respondent) in this action is the owner of a farm comprising about
1100 acres, and Ruby's Inn, at Bryce Canyon, Utah. (Tr.
93.) Most of this farm can be irrigated by gravity flow
from the defendant's canal (Tr. 94-5), which, as we stated,
runs through the farm for a distance of about three miles.
Plaintiff is a stockholder in good standing in the
defendant irrigation co~pany (Tr. 31), having purchased
50 shares of stock in the company in 1923, 270 shares in
1934, and 300 shares in 1936. The defendant company is
an appropriator of water from the East F ork of the Sevier
River, and also from some springs to the east of the
river, Some of these springs were sold to the Utah Parks
Company for use at the inn at Bryce Canyon about the
year 1926. (Tr. 311-13.) Water from defendant's canal
1
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has been used on plaintiff's land for a period of over
twenty years and plaintiff himself has used water represented by the 50 shares

"T hich

he first purchased, ever

since 1923, until the controversy over which this suit
is brought, arose. (Tr. 95, 103, 109, 207, 563.) Plaintiff,
during the irrigation season of 1925, used water represented by the 270 shares through a rental agreement with
the record owner of those shares and the consent of the
company at that time. (Tr. 111.) Objection was first made
to the use of the water by plaintiff on his farm after the
purchase of the 270 shares in 1934, and the defendant company refused to allow plaintiff to use any water at all
after that time. In the past the company has allowed
stockholders to transfer the water from one piece of land
to another from year to year, and the company has sold
stock for delinquent assessments regardless of the ownership of land. (Tr. 170, 17?.) Stockholders, other than the
plaintiff, have used water from defendant's canal on
land in the neighborhood of plaintiff's land from as early
as 1916 (Tr. 211, 272', 300, 562); and in 1923 the defendant
corporation, by and through its President and Secretary,
held that the use of water from the defendant's canal on
land in the neighborhood of plaintiff's land was permitted,
as shown by plaintiff's Exhibit 11. (Tr. 456.) 1-,he following is a copy of said exhibit, the same being a photostatic
copy of a letter from the defendant Tropic & East Fork Irrigation Company, dated February 15, 1923, and written
at Tropic, Utah, to the United States Land Office at Salt
Lake City, Utah, the original of said letter being on file
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6
in the General Land Office at Washington, D. C., which
said letter reads as follows:
"Tropic, Utah
Feb. 15, 1923
United States Land Office
Salt Lake City, Utah
Gentlemen:
"In regard to Desert land entry Serial 010224
Leonard Reynolds, and the right extended by the
Tropic and East Fork Irrigation Co. to water certain lands other than just in the Tropic Valley.
"The Tropic and East Fork Irrigation Company's canal passes through a strip of country
seven to twelve miles west of Tropic, and some of
our stock holders have entered land in that vicinity.

"Not interfering with any of the right of the
company said stock holders have and are allowed
to draw their water and use same upon said land.
(Italics added)
"This will also conform to the regulation of
State water rights.
"The Tropic and East Fork Irrigation Company does not nor has not for years increased its
capital stock, but individual stock is bought and
sold and transferred from one part of the valley
or district to another so the company takes the
stand that each stock holder may use his water
upon any land embraced within any part of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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whole systen1, so long as they do not infringe upon
any company right and each bear his equal share
of assessment.
Tropic & East Fork Irr. Co.
John H. Johnson, Pres.
Jos. D. Shakespear, Secy.
Subscribed and S"\vorn to before me this 15th day
of Feb., A. D. 1923.
MAURICE COPE,
Notary Public.
My Com. Expires
Nov. 12, 1924"
As stated above, the defendant corporation has never
been concerned with where the water was used prior to
1934 or until the controversy over which this suit is
brought arose. This is further shown by the deed of the
defendant corporation to the Los Angeles & Salt Lake
Railroad company in 1926. (Tr. 312.)
"(COPY)

PLAINTIF~''S

EXIIIBIT 10
J. T. Partridge, Clerk.

DEED
TROPIC & EAST FORK IRRIGATION
COMPANY, a corporation of the State of Utah.
Grantor hereby grants and conveys unto the LOS
ANGELES & SALT LAKE RAILROAD COMpANY, a corporation of the State of ·utah, Grantee,
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for the sum of One Thousand Five Hundred
($1500.00) Dollars
all the right title and interest of the Grantor in and
to the waters of those certain springs located and
rising in the East Half (EY2 ) of the South East
Quarter (SE7'4} of the North West Quarter (NWY4)
of Section Thirty-four (34) Township Thirty-six
(36) South, Range 4 ·west, Garfield County, Utah
located. and described as follows:
Beginning at the Quarter Corner of Section 34 and
Section 3, Township 36 South, Range 4 West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, thence North 2°26' West
a distance of 3462.1 ft. to spring No. 1.
Beginning at the Quarter Corner of Section 34 and
Section 3, Township 36 South, Range 4 West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, thence North 3° 11' West
a distance of 363'7.6 ft. to spring No. 2.
Beginning at the Quarter Corner of ·Section 34 and
Section 3, Township 36 South, Range 4 West, Sa:lt
Lake Base and Meridian, thence North 3°46' West
a distance of 3653.5 ft. to Spring No. 3.
Beginning at the Quarter Corner of Section 34, and
Section 3, Township 36 South, Range 4 West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, thence North 4°30' West
a distance of 3'7'72.6 ft. to Spring No. 4.
Beginning at the Quarter Corner of Section 34, and
Section 3, Township 36 South, Range 4 West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, thence North 3°23' West
a distance of 3880.0 ft. to Spring No. 5.
Beginning at the Quarter c·orner of Section 34, and
Section 3, Township 36 South, Range 4 West, Salt
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Lake Base and Meridian, thence North 4°0'7' West
a distance of 3900.3 ft. to spring No. 6.
Beginning at the Quarter Corner of Section 34 and
Section 3, Township 36 South, Range 4 West of the
the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, thence North
3°29' 'Vest a distance of 3949.9 ft. to Spring No. 7.
The flow of the above described springs consists
of approximately twenty-five hundredths (0.25)
second feet of water, more or less.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said Grantors has
caused these presents to be executed by its duly
constituted officers this 24th day of February, 1926.
TROPIC & EAST FORK IRRIGATION CO.
By WM. ADAIR,
(co. Seal)

Its President."

Attest:
E. H. Smith
Secretary.
Also in November, 1930, defendant corporation attempted to sell more water to the Utah Parks Company.
(Tr. 244.) This also indicates an ample supply of water in
the defendant's system.
The defendant corporation has in its canal for the
use of its stockholders from April 1st to June 1st 20.00
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second feet of water and from June 1st to October 15th
15.00 second feet. (Tr. 234). Plaintiff's Exhibit 8.
At the trial of this case in April, 1938, a non-suit was
granted from which ruling the plaintiff appealed to the
Supreme Court and the ruling of the lower court was
reversed. Case No. 6062, reported in 9'7 Utah 56, 89 P.
(2d) 4'74.

The defendants' motion for a non-suit was based
upon the theory that the district court did not have jurisdiction in the case.

The question of damages to the stockholders and
defendant corporation has also been raised by the defendant, but no proof has been offered by the defendants on
that point. On the contrary, the testimony of George F.
Taylor, an engineer formerly employed by the State
engineer, was to the effect that water could be taken from
the canal as it runs through the plaintiff's land without
interefering with the flow of water in the ditch. (Tr. 257.}
The witness further testified that assuming the water
represented by 620 shares owned by the plaintiff, R. C.
Syrett, were withdrawn at points on the canal as it runs
through the plaintiff's land near Ruby's Inn, that the
effect on the evaporation of water in the Town of Tropic
would be so slight that it would be almost impossible t,o
measure, and that further, there would be practically no
difference in the amount of seepage. (Tr. 261.)
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The water master does not visit each stockholder
"~hen it is his "~atering turn and turn the water into his
laterals, but he is simply notified as to his turn by phone
or mail and he helps himself. (Tr. 464, 467, 504, 505, 526.)
The company stands the cost of all head gates or weirs
installed, placing them wherever a stockholder requests.
(Tr. 469.)
From the dividing gate of the Lossee ·valley canal
and Tropic Valley it is about equal distance to the end
of each canal-i.e., about three miles. (Tr. 469.)
The principal contention of the appellants (defendants) is the power of the defendant corporation, under its
articles of incorporation, to deliver water to the plaintiff's farm. The appellants claim that to do so would be
ultra vires and therefore the trial court erred in ordering
the defendant to deliver water to the plaintiff's farm contrary to the claimed restrictions in the articles of incorporation, said claimed error being based on the theory
that a court has no power to compel a corporation to perform an ultra vires act.
The respondent (plaintiff) contends that the delivery
of water to the plaintiff's farm by the defendant corporation would not be an ultra vires act, but on the contrary, that the delivery of said water falls within the
implied powers and duties of the corporation. The respondent further contends that assuming the articles are
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as restrictive as claimed by the appellants, that the corporation is estopped from relying on the defense of ultra
vires because of its conduct and course of dealings over a
period of twenty.-two years.
Other questions of law raised by the appellants are
entirely incidental to this main question.
ARGUMENT
Proposition I
THE PURPOSE CLAUSE OF 1,HE ARTICLES OF
INCORPORATION OF THE DEFENDANT CORPORATION DOES NOT RESTRICT THE DELIVERY OF
WATER TO ANY PARTICULAR PLACE, BUT ON THE
CONTRARY, PERMITS ITS DELIVERY AT ANY
POINT IN THE SYSTEM FROM THE HEAD OF THE
CANAL OR DITCH TO THE LOWER END.
If the interpretation which the appellants (defendants) attempt to put on the purpose clause were strictly
carried out to its logical conclusion, one might easily say
that the only purpose for the defendant corporation was
to construct and repair a can al-i. .e., a construction
corporation. Let us examine that portion of the purpose
clause in which we are interested.
"The object of this Corporation is to construct a
canal from the East r-,ork of the Sevier· River to
Tropic and to keep the same in ·r'epair for the conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ducting of the "~ater from said strea1n to the Town
of Tropic . . ."
(Italics added).
There is nothing in this paragraph or so called purpose
clause dealing "-ith the distribution of water. It deals
with the construction and maintenance of a canal.
Further, to adopt any such strained, twisted interpretation as the appellants are attempting to put on said
purpose clause would limit the use of the water to the
limits of the 'Town of rfropic in which there are no farms,
and except for a few gardens and other small areas very
little irrigating is done or could be done.
The only mention in the Articles in regard to the
distribution of water is that reference made in Article XI:
"The Directors shall have power to levy and collect assessments on all capital of this company
for the purpose of keeping in repair all ditches
and dams, and the payment of its officers and employees, and shall divide the water to each person
(Italics
according to his stock as a dividend."
added.)
As the court can readily see, there is nothing restrictive
or even directory as to where the water should be delivered except that it should be delivered to stockholders.
The appellants (defendants) further argue that the
deed of conveyance made by the original appropriators
restricts the use of the water to the land lying in the Colorado water shed.
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A .careful reading .of the .deed;· defendanfs- Exhibit
"H," fails to disclose any such claimed reservation or
restriction. ~fhe only reference, in the deed of .convey~nce,.
to the Town of Tropic is in. the. second and third paragraphs. (We are not interested in the third paragraph
which refers to the culinary water arising in Bryce Canyon.} This is. merely~ a description of the p:rop~:rty, convey~d to the defendant corporation, and said description refers to the 1,own of 1,ropic in a. general way only.
by. saying:
"At or near the said Town __of Tropic, or in the vicinity thereof.''
·
·
We therefore submit that there is nothing in the
Articles of Incorporation or in the deed of conveyance
which in any way restricts the use or the place at which
the water belonging to the stockholders shall be used.
The plaintiff in_ this: action is. a stockholder with
land under ·the irrigation system; the canal runs :through
his land for approximately three miles; he is entitled to
all the rights of a stockholder and ;the defendant corporation owes to him all the duties which a mutual irrigation. compan:y ow.es to its stockholders.
The rights of. a_ stockholder in· a mutual irrigation·
company are .discussed in Kinney on Irrigation and Water
Rights,: Second Edition, VoL·3, Sec. 1483. The author cites,
among many cases,. the case of.,_....~ocky· Ford Canal, Reservoir, Land, Loan & Trust Company v. Sampson,. 5 Colo ..
~
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App. 30, 36 Pac. 638. The ·Colorado ·court held that a stock~
holder of an irrigation company, organized to furnish
water exclusively to its shockholders, is entitled:· to the .
proportion of water carried through its irrigation canal
which the amount. of his stock bears to the_ whole amount
of the stock of the company. The _court .also.held, inLthat
cas.e The relation between. a.corporation and its members
is one of- contract. (Italics added)
This later statement is axiomatic and needs no long
list of cases to support it.
With the thou-ght in mind. that the :right of a-,stockholder as against the corporation is one of contract, we
call the court's attention to the case of Moyle vs. Salt
Lake City, reported in 50 Utah. 35?, 16? P~ 660; which
presents certain features of striking similarity~ In· that
case, the plaintiff made a contract to exchange her water
under an appropriation from. Parley's Creek, for certain
irrigation waters- brought by the-. city through its own
canal from Utah Lake into Salt Lake valley.: The point
at which the plaintiff would accept delivery of the exchange water was not specified in the contract,- but for
years she aceepted the water at a certain point. Later,
owing to the building up of the residential section near
the lands where she used this water, she considered it
expedient to transfer the water to other lands lying several miles to the South and requested delivery of the water
at a point about five miles up the city's canal. The Supreine Court of Utah held that she was entitled to demand
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this change, remarking that, 1n its opinion, the matter
involved was in reality nothing but a change of place
of delivery.
Referring again to the rights of stockholders, we
call the court's atention to Sec. 148'7 of Vol. 3 of Kinney
on Irrigation and in particular to the case cited therein
of Miller v. Imperial vVater Co., 156 Cal. 2'7, 103 Pac.
22'7. In this case the California court held as follows:
"For instance, nothing is more thorough! y established than the rule than mandamus will lie to
restore to his corporate rights a member of a corporation who has been improperly disfranchised
or irregularly removed from his connection with
the corporation, and yet his right in this regard
generally rests wholly on his contract of membership. The same rule appears to us to be applicable
where the member is being excluded from participation in the benefits afforded by the corporation
to its members, and there is no other adequate
remedy. In the case at bar, the stockholder's rights
to have water furnished on his land is not based
on any special contract entered into by him with
the corporation, but it is an inseparable adjunct
of his membership and it is a plain duty resting
on the corporation in the exercise of its corporate
functions to furnish him such water."
A mutual irrigation company is under a duty and
obligation to furnish water exclusively to its stockholders
proportionately as the number of shares of each bears to
the whole number of shares of stock of the company. Kin-
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ney on Irrigation. 2nd Edition, ,~ol. 3, Section 1486. In addition to the foregoing, it may not be amiss to add that in
Utah, stock in mutual incorporated ditch companies is held
to be personal property, "'hich may be freely transferred by assignment, sale, execution, etc., the purchaser
taking good title and having the right to- use the water
represented by the stock on any lands on which he pleases
to use it. 3 Kinney on Irrig., 2nd Ed., Sec. 1485; George
vs. Robinson, 23 Utah '79, 63 P. 819.
This obviously makes such waters freely transferable ·to other lands under the same company's system, and
allows ·a free and ready method of changing the point
of delivery.
The appellants use much space and time in discussing the court's right to impair the contract between the
stockholders and the corporation. As counsel states it, the
court, in granting the plaintifFs prayer, is violating a
valid contract between the stockholders and the corporation.
We have no quarrel with the appellants' statement
of the law,- but we do contend that it does not apply in
this case. The only logical interpretation to be put on the
contract existing between the stockholders and the defendant corporation is that interpretation made by the
plaintiff and accepted by the court below, viz., that the
plaintiff, a stockholder is good standing, is entitled to
have the water represented by his shares of stock delivered
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to him on his land at Ruby's Inn, said land being within
the irrigation system of the defendant corporation.
Proposition II
A CORPORATION HAS THE POWER TO DO
ALL THINGS WHICH ARE NECESSARILY IN ITS
STATED OBJECTS.
The defense of the defendant sets forth that the
stated object of the corporation was:
"To construct a canal from the East Fork of the
Sevier River to Tropic, and to keep the same in repair for the conducting of the water in said stream
to the Town of Tropic."
If the stated purpose is the only business which the corporation can carry on, it has no power to distribute water
to its stockholders in the Town of Tropic or anywhere
else. Such a construction of the stated purposes is absurd.
If there is implied in these stated purposes the right
to distribute water to stockholders in the Town of Tropic,
there is also implied the right to distribute water to stockholders at any point along the canal between the East Fork
of the Sevier River and Tropic; and the settled practice
of the con1pany over the entire term of its existence has
resulted in an interpretation of these stated objects which
has been relied upon by the plaintiff and cannot now be
changed to plaintiff's detriment.
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If the corporation has the right to take water from
Point . A. to Point G and deliver it to users at Point G,
it clearly has the power to take ''Tater from Point A to
intermediate points B. C. D. E, and F, and deliver water
to users at those points.
13 Am. Jur. ?'?'2, Section ?'40:

"General Nature and Scope of Implied and Incidental Powers.--It is a well-recognized rule that
a corporation is not restricted to the exercise of
the powers expressly conferred upon it by its
charter, but has the implied or incidental power to
do whatever is reasonably necessary to effectuate
the powers expressly granted and to accomplish
the purpose for which it was formed, unless the
particular act sought to be done is prohibited by
the law or by its charter. Otherwise stated, a corporation, like a natural per.son, has a right to conduct its legitimate business by all the means necessary to effect such object. The implied powers
which a corporation has in order to carry into effect those expressly granted and to accomplish
the purposes of its creation are not limited to
such as are indispensable for these purposes, but
comprise all that are necessary, in .. the sense of
appropriate and suitable, including the right of
reasonable choice of means to be employed. Again,
acts which, if standing alone or when engaged in
as a business, would be beyond the powers of the
corporation are not necessarily ultra vires when
they are merely incidental to, or form a part of,
an entire transaction which in its general scope is
within the corporate purpose."
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Proposition III
IF TilE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION WERE
IN:IENDED 1'0 BE RESTRICTIVE, THEN THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN SUCH
1'HAT IT IS STOPPED FROM RELYING ON THE
DOCTRINE OF ULTRA -VIRES AS A DEFENSE.
Regardless of what was the intention of the incorporators at the time of the drawing of the articles, we
find them at the very beginning constructing a canal
around to Lossee Valley. Then as early as 1916 stockholders were using water in the neighborhood of the
plaintiff's land (Tr. 211, 2?7, 300, 562); and from 1923
to 1934 there was delivered to the plaintiff the water represented by his fifty shares of stock with no question
whatsoever being raised. In 1926 the defendant sold
to the Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad water out of its
system to he used on the plateau near the plaintiff's land.
In this respect, we call to the court's attention the
case of Clark et al v. North Cottonwood Irrigation &
Water Co., reported in ?9 Utah 425, 11 Pac. (2d) 300,
wherein the court held:
"Moreover, the provisions of the articles of incorporation are not necessarily controlling in fixing
the present right of the parties to this litigation.
The articles were executed in 1891, so that the
present rights of the parties depend rather upon
the use to which the water has been put since the
organization of the defendant company than upon
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the provisions contained in its articles of incorporation."
\Ve also call the court's attention to Section 623,
Williston on Contracts, Revised Edition, as to the interpretation of contracts; also to Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations, Permanent Edition, Vol. 7, beginning at Page
'2"75.

The respondent submits therefore that if· there is
any ambiguity in the articles such ambiguity should be
resolved against the corporation and in favor of the plaintiff. In other words, the corporation is estopped from·
relying on the doctrine of ultra vires by reason of its
course of conduct over the years from at least 1916 to and
including 1934.
In the case of Bear River Valley Orchard Co. v.
P. M. Hanley, 15 Utah 506, 50 Pac. 611; our court said:
"The doctrine of ultra vires, when invoked for or
against a corporation should not be allowed when
it would defeat the ends of justice or work a legal
wrong. ''
See also 13 Am. Jur. 793, Sec. 766 and cases listed In
note thereto. In 14A-C. J., 324, it is said:
"However, other authorities have so limited the
·doctrine of ultra vires, as to private corporations,
created for business purposes, by applying to them
the doctrine of estoppel, as almost to destroy it,
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and in the majority of jurisdictions support the
rule than an ultra vires transaction when executed
by one of the parties may become enforceable by
estoppel."

Proposition IV
In regard to the appellant's Assignment of Error
No. 2, we call the court's attention to Finding of Fact
No. 22 in which is set out all the facts necessary to constitute or set up an estoppel. As to whether these facts
result in an estoppel is properly a question of law and the
court, in its Conclusions of Law, concluded that the defendant was estopped from denying that it did not have
the right and power under its articles to deliver water
to the plaintiff. (Conclusion of Law No. '7.)
The appellant also complains and assigns as error
(4, 5, 6, '7) certain findings of the trial court, claiming
they are inconsistent. This is answered by reading merely
the Complaint and recalling the evidence. The facts
.show that water was used on the land of the plaintiff
by the plaintiff from 1923 to 1934 and by others from
1916 to and including the date of trial. (The Los Angeles
& Salt Lake Railroad at the Lodge at Bryce Canyon.)
(Findings of Fact 10, 12, 14.)
In 1935, the defendant stopped delivering water to
the plaintiff which act resulted in this law suit. (Tr. 109.)
Finding of Fact No. 6, when considered with Finding of
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Fact No. "!, clearly shows that there is nothing_ inconsistent between the various findings.
This being an equity case, the Supreme Court may
review the record, approve or disapprove the findings,
or modify them or make or direct findings. Holm v. Holm,
44 Utah 242, 139 Pac. 937; Westminster Inv. Co. v. McCurtain, 39 Utah 544, 118 Pac. 564; Leland v. Bourne, 41 Utah
... J p ac. 65)
:....
1...')-J, 19Proposition V
The appellants claim (Assignment of Error No. 8)
that the court erred in its Finding No. 16, claiming there
was no evidence to support it. We simply call the court's
attention to the testimony of George F. Taylor, (Tr. 25'7)
and to the fact that it is not the practice of the water boss
or master to visit each stockholder when it is his turn
to take water. (Tr. 463, 46'7, 504, 505, 506, 526.) We may
point out, also, that the company has stood the cost of all
head gates or weirs installed. (Tr. 469.)
This argument of the appellants again shows the
attempt on the part of the defendant and their present
officers to discriminate against the plaintiff.
In regard to the reference of the appellants to the
loss of seepage or drainage water, we again call the
court's attention to testimony of the expert Mr. Taylor
(Tr. 261, 262, 2'74), in which he testified that there would
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not be any loss to the defendant corporation or other
stockholders because of seepage or evaporation.
The appellants claim that the use of water by plaintiff will prevent various persons who have been using
waste water from defendant's irrigation system to obtain the right to use this water since the use of the water
by plaintiff will be in a different water shed from where
it had been used before.
The cases are legion that no right can be acquired to
waste water which has been beneficially used by another.
Or, stated in another way, no one can require a valid
appropriator of water to continue to use that water so
that waste water will result which can be used by another.
Among the many cases on this proposition we cite the
following:
Gianulakis v. Sharp, 71. Utah 528, 267 P. 1017; Spring
Creek Irrigation Company v. Zollinger, 58 Utah 90, 197
P. '737. Weil Water Rights in the Western States (3rd Ed.),
Vol 1, Sec. 508, p. 548; Kinney on Irrigation and Water
Rights (2nd Ed.), Vol. 2, Sec. 867, p. 1522. The appellants
Assignments of Error Nos. 9, 10, 11, 1.3, 14, 15 and 16 are
merely restatements of No. 8, and the answer to that
assignment answers the other assignments.
In reg·ard to Assignment of Error No. 11 in which the
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appellant claims it ""ill be necessary to install special
measuring devices and supervise thereof if the plaintiff is
delivered his water, ,,~e call the court's attention to the
fact that during the large number of years plaintiff used
the ,,~ater represented by the fifty shares there was no
additional expense to the company for supervision and
measuring devices.

We again direct the court's attention to the evidence
on Page 464 of the Transcript where the defendant,
Johnson, testified that when Reynolds received the water
on the plateau near Ruby's Inn there was no increase
of expense for delivery, and on the same page the witness, Johnson, further testified that the water master
did not personally turn the water on to his farm when
it was his turn to irrigate.

As to the necessity of requ1r1ng the installation of
measuring devices for the plaintiff's land, we again call
the court's attention to the evidence. The testimony of
William Adair, a witness for the defendant as shown
on page 506 of the Transcript, is that there is only one
weir or measuring box on the entire system and that
one is the one to divide the stream between the East
Valley or Los see Valley and the Tropic ditch. All of the
outlets on the entire system are governed by mere guesswork. To suggest that the appellants will need measuring
devices for the plaintiff to use by which to measure his
water, would seem very, very far-fetched.
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CONCLUSION
A stockholder in a mutual irrigation company who
has been denied the right to use water represented by his
shares of stock has a cause of action against the company.
In the case at bar the plaintiff is a stockholder in
good standing with land lying under the irrigation system, and as such is entitled to have delivered to him,
on his land, the water represented by his shares of stock
in the corporation.
In light of the law in the case and of the evidence,
the defendant (appellant) has wholly failed to show any
grounds for a reversal of the judgment below.
We respectfully submit therefore that the judgment
should be sustained.

H. D. LOWRY,
Attorney for Respondent.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

